My research is in ethics and social/political philosophy.

Right now, my primary research project is concerned with giving an account of the meaning and moral significance of domestic violence. Some of my other projects include exploring how we ought to educate citizens in non-ideal circumstances, the moral significance of our social relationships, and how we should understand and respond to the different kinds of moral harms individuals can suffer.

Publications and forthcoming:

In this article, I argue that victims of domestic violence characteristically suffer from two distinct kinds of moral harm: moral damage and moral injury. Moral damage occurs when the ability to develop or sustain good moral character has been compromised by an agent’s circumstances. Moral injury refers to a kind of psychological anguish that follows from when an agent causes or becomes causally implicated in actions that we ordinarily would understand to be morally grievous offenses. A victim who suffers from moral damage may not suffer from any psychological anguish; instead, a victim may consistently, although regrettably, devalue herself. A victim who suffers from moral injury may not suffer from a deficient moral character; she may be an exceptionally virtuous person who is faced with only morally regrettable options. Because abusers often expect victims to adopt morally deficient dispositions and often implicate victims in wrongdoing, I argue that victims of domestic violence characteristically suffer from both moral damage and moral injury. By appreciating the differences in the moral experiences of the victim, we become better positioned to identify strategies for responding to or repairing the different harms they suffer.

In progress:

  • Domestic Violence, Domination, and Social Death

  • The Gendered Basis of Gender-Based Violence

  • The Varieties of Moral Harm

  • Teaching to Trust

  • An Aristotelian Approach to Education in Non-Ideal Circumstances